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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF REHABILITATIVE
AND SUBSTANTIVE PRIOR CONSISTENT
STATEMENTS AND THE TEMPORAL
REQUIREMENT
If the testimony of a witness is impeached during a trial, the
introduction of a prior consistent statement may aid in reestab-
lishing the witness's credibility.1 Generally, a statement made
outside of the courtroom constitutes hearsay and is deemed inad-
missible.2 However, under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)
("Rule 801(d)(1)(B)"), a prior statement may be admitted if it is
"consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut
an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive."3 Therefore, if there is
a charge that the witness fabricated his testimony, or had an im-
proper influence or motive, then the witness's testimony is consid-
ered impeached and the prior statements are admissible to reha-
1 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). According to the rule, the prior consistent statement
must "rebut an express or implied charge.., of a recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive." Id. Admitting this type of statement may afford a witness's original testimony
greater credibility because it can demonstrate that his testimony has remained consistent.
Id. The rule permitting this introduction is found within the hearsay exception of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d). This rule provides three exceptions for
when a statement will not be considered hearsay. Id.; see also United States v. Harris, 761
F.2d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 1985) (consistent statements from interview admissible so fact-
finder can determine whether impeaching and inconsistent statements from interview
were taken out of context); United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273 (6th Cir. 1982)
(allowing statements to come before motive to lie, but still adhering to Rule 801(d)(1)(B)),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983); United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 232 (2d Cir. 1978)
(developing three prong test which encompassed requirements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)).
2 See FED. R. EvID. 801(c). Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted." Id.; Harris, 761 F.2d at 398 (demonstrating requirements for hear-
say); United States v. Herring, 582 F.2d 535, 536 (10th Cir. 1978) (giving trial court discre-
tion to determine hearsay).
3 FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(B). The enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence changed
the admissibility standard for evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note.
Originally, before the acceptance of the rule in 1975, prior consistent statements were only
admissible to rehabilitate the credibility of a witness. See Yvette Olstein, Pierre and Bren-
nan: The Rehabilitation of Prior Consistent Statements, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 515, 515 (1987).
Substantive evidence, which is intended to prove the truth of the issue asserted, was not
considered prior to the adoption of the rule. Id. But with both rehabilitative and substan-
tive evidence presently accepted as prior consistent statements, the amount of statements
under the hearsay exception is greatly increased. Id.
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bilitate the witness or substantiate his testimony.4
However, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not expressly require that the
prior consistent statement precede the motive to fabricate in order
to be admissible. 5 As a result, the circuit courts are divided on
whether such a temporal requirement exists.6 In addition, the cir-
cuits which allow the admission of statements to postdate the mo-
tive to fabricate are split on whether these statements can be used
for substantive7 and rehabilitative8 purposes. 9
4 See FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) was intended to
make prior consistent statements admissible not only to rehabilitate the credibility of a
witness but also as substantive evidence of the events asserted. Id. The advisory committee
stated:
Prior consistent statements traditionally have been admissible to rebut charges of re-
cent fabrication or improper influence or motive but not as substantive evidence.
Under the rule they are substantive evidence. The prior statement is consistent with
the testimony given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for
its admission into evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received
generally.
Id. This was a significant alteration to the hearsay rule because '[flor nearly 200 years last
past, the courts have enforced, except in certain very limited circumstances, a general pro-
hibition against the use of prior consistent statements." See Quinto, 582 F.2d at 232. Pri-
marily, prior consistent statements were previously always considered irrelevant. Id.
5 See United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 242, 249 (10th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging require-
ments of Federal Rules of Evidence); Edward D. Ohlbaum, The Hobgoblin of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: An Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent Statements and a New
Proposal, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 231, 232 (1987) (discussing various judicial interpretations of
post motive admissibility standard demonstrating that rule is absent any such language).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Vest, 842 F.2d 1319, 1320 (1st Cir.) (admitting statements
made before motive to fabricate existed), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 812 (1988); United States v.
Henderson, 717 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1983) (admitting prior consistent statement only if
statement was made prior to time supposed motive to falsify arose), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1009 (1984); United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 434 (9th Cir. 1983) (admitted prior
consistent statements to rehabilitate only when made before witness had motive to fabri-
cate); United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 235 (2d. Cir. 1978) (holding that admission of
prior consistent statement must come before motive to lie if used as substantive evidence).
For circuits which have held that some form of prior consistent statements may postdate
the fabrication motive, see United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(admitting prior consistent statements without mandating temporal requirement); United
States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 903 (3rd Cir. 1991) (declaring that rehabilitative state-
ments can postdate any fabrication motive); United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 532
(8th Cir.) (admission or rejection of prior consistent statement which postdates motive to
fabricate is addressed to sound discretion of trial court and will not be reversed on appeal
except when there has been prejudicial abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 963
(1986); United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 915 (11th Cir. 1986) (asserting that mo-
tive is not relevant to admissibility of prior consistent statements); United States v. Harris,
761 F.2d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 1985) (admitting statements which postdate motive to fabri-
cate); United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273 (6th Cir. 1982) (timing of prior con-
sistent statements may only affect materiality), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983); United
States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1981) (considering temporal requirement insuf-
ficient); United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1349 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding it was proper
to allow jury to hear both consistent statements which postdate impeaching statements to
evaluate witness's credibility), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981).
7 BLAcis'S LAw DicTIONARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990). Substantive evidence is introduced for
the truth of the matter asserted by being "adduced for the purpose of proving a fact in issue
.. ." Id.
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This Note examines the existence of a temporal requirement
when admitting prior consistent statements to rebut an alleged
fabrication, or improper influence or motive, under Rule
801(d)(1)(B). Part One consists of an analysis of the circuits,
which demonstrates the division among the circuit courts with re-
spect to whether a temporal requirement is imposed by Rule
801(d)(1)(B). Where applicable, Part One also indicates those cir-
cuits which distinguish between substantive and rehabilitative
statements when admitting statements that postdate the motive
to fabricate. Part Two examines the necessity of mandating a
temporal requirement for the admissibility of all prior consistent
statements. Finally, this Note concludes that allowing the admis-
sion of statements made after the motive to fabricate confuses a
jury, and urges the Supreme Court to resolve this issue.
8 Id. at 1287. Rehabilitative evidence is introduced so that "a witness whose credibility
has suffered may be examined again to improve his standing with the trier of fact in mat-
ters covered on cross-examination." Id.
9 See Casoni, 950 F.2d at 897 (holding that prior consistent statements were not admis-
sible for rehabilitative purposes); Andrade, 799 F.2d at 532 (admitting both rehabilitative
and substantive statements after motive to fabricate); United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d
333, 228 (8th Cir. 1986) (allowing rehabilitative prior consistent statements to postdate
motive to fabricate, but refusing to allow substantive statements to follow motive), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987); Anderson, 782 F.2d at 915-16 (rejecting assertion that reha-
bilitative or substantive prior consistent statements need to postdate motive).
Some circuits will only admit prior consistent statements if they are solely used for reha-
bilitative purposes. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). The distinction between rehabilitative
and substantive evidence is the result of an attempt to analyze the probative value of the
statements when determining their admissibility. Id. The appendix Federal Rules of Evi-
dence explains:
Clearly, statements made before an improper motive could have existed are likely to be
most probative. Yet other circumstances may suggest that even later statements were
made at a time when there was, in fact, no real likelihood of an improper motive to
fabricate or of undue influence. In such circumstances courts are likely to exclude
evidence.
See Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, in FEDERAL RULES OF EVI-
DENCE 400, 400 (1992). A substantive statement, not a rehabilitative statement, proves the
truth of a statement; see also Olstein, supra note 3, at 515. The author states:
A prior consistent statement admitted to rehabilitate a witness is not used to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. Rather, such a statement is used to rebut an inference
raised by the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement that contradicts present
testimony. When used for rehabilitative purposes, the accuracy or truthfulness of a
prior consistent statement is irrelevant.
Id. at 529. The Supreme Court has neglected to address this issue. See Beech Aircraft Cor-
poration v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 172 (1988). This is the only case in which the Supreme
Court has mentioned Rule 801(dX1)(B), and there was no ruling made on the temporal
requirement. Id.
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I. ANALYSIS OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR CONSISTENT
STATEMENTS WITHIN CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS
A. The First Circuit
The First Circuit has held that the prior consistent statement
must precede the motive to fabricate for the statement to be ad-
missible. 10 In United States v. Vest," a prior consistent statement
was deemed admissible only after it was determined to have pre-
ceded the motive to lie.' 2 A witness's credibility was challenged
when he testified that the defendant was to deliver a $35,000 pay-
ment under a prearranged agreement.' 3 The First Circuit held
that the trial court's factual determination on the issue was not
erroneous and the evidence of a phone conversation was properly
admitted because it was not made before there was a motive to
lie. 4 The Vest court established the First Circuit's requirement for
a prior consistent statement to come before a fabrication motive.'"
B. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit has extensively examined the admissibility
of prior consistent statements, and has held that statements must
precede the fabrication motive in order to be admitted for substan-
tive purposes.' 6 However, there has been opposition, within the
circuit, on mandating a temporal requirement when the state-
ment is used for rehabilitative purposes.' 7 Presently, a statement
10 See Vest, 842 F.2d at 1329. A factual determination had to be made by the trial court
to ascertain that there was no motive to lie at the time the statement was made, before the
testimony could be admitted into evidence. Id.
11 842 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 965 (1988).
12 Id. at 1329 (admitting witness's phone conversations only because witness lacked any
motive to fabricate at time of conversations).
13 Id. at 1328. Vest was convicted on two counts of making false declarations to a grand
jury. Id. It was suggested that a witness created an elaborate story of police corruption and
a prior consistent statement was introduced. Id. at 1329.
14 Id. at 1329. "[T]he statements were sufficiently consistent and were made before... a
motive to fabricate." Id. at 1330.
15 Vest, 842 F.2d at 1329.
16 See United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384, 294 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing prior consis-
tent statement made before motive to fabricate to place impeaching statements in context);
United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69 (2d Cir. 1979) (admitted memoranda by govern-
ment agent for rehabilitative use made before motive to fabricate on grounds of complete-
ness rather that Rule 801(d)(1)(B)), affd, 449 U.S. 424 (1981); United States v. Quinto, 582
F.2d 224, 235 (2d Cir. 1978). Quinto's seminal decision disallows the use of prior consistent
statements after the alleged motive to fabricate. Id.
17 See Rubin, 609 F.2d at 69. A concurring opinion by Judge Henry J. Friendly contra-
dicts the circuit's position by claiming that "Rule 801(d)(1)(B) simply does not deal with the
extent to which prior consistent statements may be used for rehabilitation." Id.; United
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cannot be admitted if it is made after the alleged motive to lie.'8
Additionally, the fabrication motive may not have to be clearly
identified if the statement will be used for rehabilitative
purposes. 9
In United States v. Quinto,2 ° the Second Circuit analyzed the
admissibility of prior consistent statements. 21 An Internal Reve-
nue Service agent's credibility was questioned during his testi-
mony against the defendant, an alleged tax evader.22 Counsel for
the defendant impeached the agent by implying that he was ruth-
lessly seeking a conviction, and had an improper motive to falsify
trial testimony.23 On cross-examination, the government sought
to introduce a memorandum, as a prior consistent statement, to
corroborate the agent's testimony.24
The Second Circuit established a three-criteria test to deter-
mine whether the agent's prior consistent statement could be ad-
mitted.2" The first requirement was that the prior consistent
States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929, 930 (2d Cir.) (debating proper admissibility of prior consis-
tent statements for rehabilitative purposes), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
18 See Rubin, 609 F.2d at 62 (holding that despite strong argument by Judge Friendly,
Second Circuit reaffirmed Quinto decision, and declared that timing of alleged motive to
fabricate is significant when used for rehabilitative purposes).
19 See United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 587 (2d Cir. 1986). In Brennan, the exact
motive to fabricate was unclear, but the court nevertheless permitted the admission of a
prior consistent statement. Id.
20 582 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1978).
21 Id. at 229. Quinto was convicted of tax evasion and of willfully subscribing false in-
come tax returns after a six-day jury trial. Id. Several other circuits, including the Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth, have cited the Quinto decision. See United States v. Andrade, 788
F.2d 521, 532 (8th Cir.) (extent to which rehabilitative evidence may be received is left to
discretion of trial court), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 963 (1986); United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d
394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985) (although prior consistent statements may meet literal require-
ments of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), it may be inadmissible for failure to meet relevancy require-
ment of Rule 402); United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273 (6th Cir. 1982) (indicat-
ing desire for more relaxed standard of admissibility than Quinto rule), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1117 (1983); see also United States v. Wilkinson, 754 F.2d 1427, 1433 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1019 (1985). An implied fabrication in the testimony of a witness war-
ranted the use of the test. Id. Wilkinson is another example of the Second Circuit adhering
to the three requirements. Id. In Wilkinson, the Quinto criteria was referred to and utilized
as the primary requirement for the admission of a prior consistent statement. Id.; United
States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 1980). In Shulman, the Second Circuit ad-
mitted prior consistent statements "for the limited purpose of bolstering the credibility of
the government's witnesses" because the three Quinto requirements were satisfied. Id.
22 See Quinto, 582 F.2d at 226. The testifying agent stated that during the interview
Quinto admitted that he was "trying to screw the government out of some cash if [he]
could." Id. at 229.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 234. The memorandum summarized an interview with the defendant. Id. The
defense objected to the admission of the document, and the judge sustained the objection.
Id. at 229.
25 See United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1978).
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statement be consistent with the witness's direct testimony. 26 Sec-
ond, the party seeking to introduce the statement, had to establish
that the statement would rebut an express or implied charge of a
false statement. Finally, the asserting party had to demonstrate
that the prior consistent statement predated the lie.28 If this crite-
ria was satisfied, the prior consistent statement could be used for
substantive and rehabilitative purposes.29
However, in Quinto, the court held that the third requirement
was not satisfied.3 ° Without meeting the temporal requirement,
the Second Circuit considers prior consistent statements to be ir-
relevant.3 ' Since the alleged motive to lie existed, both at the time
the memorandum was compiled and at the trial, the prior consis-
tent statement was inadmissible.2
In United States v. Rubin,3 3 Quinto was reaffirmed despite a
forceful concurring opinion by Judge Henry J. Friendly, which ar-
gued that the temporal requirement was unnecessary.34 In Rubin,
notes by a government agent were introduced by the prosecution
as prior consistent statements to rebut a charge of fabrication
made by the defendant.35 The court reserved making a decision on
whether the time limitation was mandatory for rehabilitative pur-
poses, but held that if the agent's prior consistent statement was
26 See id.
27 See id. Both of these first two requirements are found in Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Id. at 233.
28 See id. at 234. The court stated that "the proponent must demonstrate that the prior
consistent statement was made prior to the time that the alleged falsity arose." Id. For
another case where the Quinto criterion was applied, see United States v. Check, 582 F.2d
668, 675 (2d Cir. 1978). In Check, the judgement of conviction was reversed and remanded
for a new trial because the prior consistent statements were not offered to rebut an ex-
pressed or implied charge of a recent fabrication. Id. The court questioned the admission of
the proposed prior consistent statements as possibly being an artful way to introduce what
was normally considered inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 679. After acknowledging these po-
tential subversive motives, the court stated that the government was not immunized from
the prospective effect of the hearsay rule and the statements should not have been admit-
ted. Id. at 680. The exception to the hearsay rule, set forth in the Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(B), was not applicable to the prior statements because they were not offered to
rebut an express or implied fabrication. Id. at 681.
29 See Quinto, 582 F.2d at 235.
30 See id.
31 Id.
32 See id. at 234. However, the court did not explain "exactly what improper motive
might have existed at trial that did not also exist at the time of the compilation of the
memorandum." Id.
33 609 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1979), affd, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
34 Id. at 68 (Friendly, J., concurring).
35 Id. at 62. The notes were considered properly admitted as prior consistent statements
despite a contention by the defendant that the notes were unclear. Id. The defendant was
convicted of conspiracy to violate statutes prohibiting false statements in connection with
loan applications, mail, wire, and securities fraud. Id.
TEMPORAL REQUIREMENT
offered as substantive evidence, the temporal requirement would
be satisfied. 36
In his concurring opinion, Judge Friendly stated that the third
element of the Quinto test was not mandated by the Federal
Rules, and was contrary to the underlying liberal policy of the
Federal Rules. 7 He claimed that mandating a temporal require-
ment for rehabilitative evidence was unnecessary.38 Judge
Friendly's opinion has been relied on by the Seventh Circuit,
which strongly disagrees with mandating the third Quinto crite-
rion.39 The Seventh Circuit states that evidence offered solely to
rehabilitate a witness's credibility should not be subjected to a
temporal requirement.4 °
In United States v. Brennan,4 Judge Friendly's proposed modi-
fication to the Quinto requirements resurfaced, but the court did
not substantiate the implementation of a less-rigorous standard
for rehabilitative evidence.42 The defendant, a justice for the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, was on trial for taking
bribes and corruption of his judicial office. 43 A witness, who testi-
fied about payments made to the defendant, was impeached and
the prosecution sought to introduce a fundamentally similar state-
ment made before there appeared to be a motive to fabricate.4 4
The court adhered to the discretion of the trial judge45 and did not
find any error in permitting the admission of a prior consistent
statement, even though the exact motive to fabricate was un-
36 Id. at 61. The Court considered it unnecessary to discuss the temporal requirement
issue for rehabilitative evidence. Id.
37 See id. at 69 (Friendly, J., concurring). Judge Friendly argued that the third criterion
of the test, which made it compulsory for the prior consistent statement to predate the
alleged motive to fabricate, was not mandated by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id.
38 See United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 66 (2d. Cir. 1978) (Friendly, J., concurring).
Judge Friendly stated that "the limitations apply only to the use of prior consistent state-
ments as affirmative evidence and are not controlling when such statements are used only
for rehabilitation." Id.
39 See United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985) (analyzing Quinto re-
quirement as unnecessary).
40 Id. The Seventh Circuit states that the temporal requirement "need not be met to
admit into evidence prior consistent statements which are offered solely to rehabilitate a
witness rather that as evidence of the matters asserted in those statements." Id.
41 798 F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1022 (1989).
42 Id. at 587.
43 Id.
44 Id. The witness acted as a middleman in collecting money for Brennan. Id. His credi-
bility was impeached by the defendant's implication that he made a deal with the prosecu-
tion. Id. The prosecution introduced a statement the witness made prior to the alleged
motive to fabricate. Id.
45 Id.
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clear.4 6 The Second Circuit forcefully reaffirmed its position that
in all situations a prior consistent statement must have been
made before the declarant had a motive to fabricate.47
C. The Third Circuit
Contrary to the Second Circuit's approach, the Third Circuit ad-
mits prior consistent statements that follow an alleged
fabrication.4' The circuit has even upheld a decision that permit-
ted the admission of a prior consistent statement without any mo-
tive to fabricate. 49 In United States v. Asher,5" statements by a co-
conspirator of the defendant, Robert Asher, were admitted into ev-
idence even though there was no implied fabrication. 5 Since it
was unlikely that the admission of the statements constituted
irreversible error, the decision based on the improperly admitted
evidence, was upheld.52
The Third Circuit has held that rehabilitative evidence may fol-
low the alleged motive to fabricate.53 In United States v. Casoni, 4
46 United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 589 (2d Cir. 1986). The court stated that the
motive to fabricate was constant and that it did not matter if the "statement is put in
through specific testimony or through mischaracterization or suggestive or misleading
cross-examination . .. ." Id.
47 See id. at 587.
4 See United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 902 (3d Cir. 1991) (admitting prior consis-
tent statements for rehabilitative purposes).
49 See United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1499 (3d Cir. 1988). A violation of the
required elements which constituted a valid hearsay exception within Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
was discovered and considered a harmless error. Id. at 1500. In the absence of any implied
fabrication, prior consistent statements were admitted. Id. at 1499. The Federal Rules of
Evidence classify prior consistent statements which lack an alleged motive to fabricate as
hearsay and are uniformly disallowed. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d). However, in Asher, the
erroneous lower court's decision was acknowledged and affirmed by the Third Circuit. See
Asher, 854 F.2d at 1500. Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., in an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, adamantly proclaimed "that the government ha[d] failed-by a
margin that is not even close-to bear its burden of demonstrating that the evidentiary
error at appellant's trial was harmless" and the conviction should be vacated "solely on the
ground that prejudicial hearsay evidence was illegally admitted into evidence." Id. at 1515.
Other circuits usually attempt to modify the wording and the useful practicality of addi-
tional requirements placed upon Rule 801(dXl)(B), but in this case, the Third Circuit effec-
tively eliminated a portion of the rule. See United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 229 (2d
Cir. 1978). The Asher case also reveals another uncommon characteristic by becoming more
liberal with the admissibility of a prior consistent statement used as substantive evidence.
See Asher, 854 F.2d at 1485.
50 854 F.2d 1483 (3d Cir. 1988).
51 See id. at 1499.
52 Id. at 1500. The court stated that the admission constituted harmless error and that it
was "highly probable that the admission of [the statement] did not tip the balance by con-
tributing to the jury's judgement of conviction." Id.
53 See United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1991).
54 950 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1991).
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a prior consistent statement was admitted for rehabilitative pur-
poses, even though the statement was made while the witness had
an improper motive of saving himself from criminal liability.55
The defendant sought to bar statements made by the witness to
the prosecutor concerning notes taken on a business document.56
The court held that the statements were admissible for the limited
rehabilitative purpose offered, even though they were made after
the motive to falsify.57 Thus, if evidence is not admitted for sub-
stantive purposes, the Third Circuit disregards the necessity of a
temporal requirement, and permits rehabilitative evidence. 51
D. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit established that any prior consistent state-
ment, intended to be used as rehabilitative or substantive evi-
dence, should not be admitted if made after the motive to fabri-
cate.59  In United States v. Henderson,6 0  a prior consistent
56 Id. at 907. Casoni was being tried for conspiracy to commit crimes against the United
States, interstate travel in aid of racketeering, bribery, and mail fraud. Id. at 896. In an
attempt to stop the admission of the prior consistent statements, Casoni maintained that
the statements were not completely consistent with the testimony at trial. Id. at 907.
66 Id. at 896. The written out-of-court declarations made to an attorney were after the
motive to fabricate. Id.
67 Id. at 896-97. According to the Third Circuit, the rule does not require the prior con-
sistent statement to be consistent in every detail. Id.58 See id. at 893. In Casoni, the court ruled that there was no abuse of discretion in
permitting the admission of the statements. Id. at 897.
59 See United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1983). The Henderson
court held that prior consistent statements must be made before the motive to fabricate in
order to be admissible. Id.; see also United States v. Bolick, 917 F.2d 135, 136 (4th Cir.
1990) (stating that admission of prior consistent statements made before impeachment was
an error, even if statements were offered only for rehabilitation); United States v. Weil, 561
F.2d 1109, 1111 (4th Cir. 1977). "Corroborative testimony consisting of prior, consistent
statements is ordinarily inadmissible unless the testimony sought to be bolstered has first
been impeached." Id. at 1111. However, the circuit has allowed for an exception to this
contention. See United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 784 (4th Cir. 1983). In Parodi, a
prior consistent statement of a witness, whose testimony has been allegedly impeached,
was deemed admissible irrespective of when the motive to fabricate developed. Id. at 785.
The Parodi court focused on the absence of a temporal requirement within the statutory
language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), stating that "[i]f the drafters of the rule intended any other
conditions for admissibility, it must be assumed they would have added them." Id. at 784.
Because Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not affirmatively state the necessity for the motive to pre-
cede the statement may just mean that the drafters assumed it was implied. See infra
notes 168-174 and accompanying text (explaining that drafters intended Rule 801(d)(1)(8)
to comply with common-law standard, which did impose temporal requirement). In Parodi,
if the defendant made a timely objection, the statements would not have been admissible,
but because the defendant waited until after his conviction before raising an objection, the
court allowed the statement to be admitted. Parodi, 703 F.2d at 784. This is apparent be-
cause in Henderson, the Fourth Circuit refused to allow the statements to postdate the
motive and stated that "the holding in Parodi... is fully consistent with our decision in the
present case." Henderson, 717 F.2d at 138 n.1.
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statement was declared admissible only because the statement
was made before the time the supposed motive to falsify arose.6 A
statement made to an FBI agent, by one of the defendant's accom-
plices, was admitted over the defendant's objection.62 Since the ac-
complice was in custody, there was an inference that his in-court
testimony was fabricated in return for leniency, and therefore, a
prior consistent statement was needed to rehabilitate his testi-
mony.63 The Fourth Circuit held that it was not error to admit the
statement because it was made prior to the time the defendant
entered into the plea bargain.64
The Fourth Circuit has also held that a prior consistent state-
ment cannot be admitted until the witness's testimony is im-
peached.65 In United States v. Bolick,66 the court held that the ad-
mission of the statements was erroneous because the admission
came before the declarants were impeached.6 7 The Bolick court
declared that an alleged fabrication must be present before the
admission of a prior consistent statement so that the jury could
understand the statement's significance.6" If the jury must re-
serve forming an opinion on the evidence until the impeachment
occurs, it would be extremely difficult for them to wait until the
court could provide proper instructions on the admissibility of the
60 717 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1009 (1984).
61 Id. at 138. Henderson contended that the motive for fabrication arose at the time of
the witness's arrest, but was rejected by the court. Id.
62 Id. at 137.
63 Id. at 138.
64 Id. at 139. The defendant argued that the motive to fabricate arose at the time the
witness was arrested. Id. The Fourth Circuit, however, agreed with the government's con-
tention that the defendant's "argument effectively swallows the rule with respect to prior
consistent statements made to government officers: by definition such statements would
never be prior to the event of apprehension or investigation by the government which gave
rise to a motive to falsify." Id.
65 See United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135, 139 (4th Cir. 1983). Each circuit tends
to develop a consistent pattern concerning decisions dealing with the admission of prior
consistent statements. Id.
66 917 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1990).
67 Id. at 138. Bolick was on trial for selling cocaine and conspiring to sell cocaine. Id. at
136. The district court permitted the government's witness to testify about statements
made to him by the declarants before any of the declarants had taken the stand. Id. at 137.
The defendant made numerous objections to the admission of these statements and the
court instructed the jury as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, I will instruct you concerning [a] point of law-at
this point, the testimony of this witness, concerning the transactions and discussions
that he had with Mr. Ray Dicks, as to statements by Mr. Dicks, will be taken by you
not for the proof of what Mr. Dicks is said to have stated, but as corroboration of Mr.
Dicks' testimony to come later in this case.
Id.
68 Id. at 140.
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evidence.6 9
E. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit provides for the admission of rehabilitative
and substantive prior consistent statements to follow the motive
to fabricate. v In United States v. Gandy,7' prior consistent state-
ments were made after evidence of an alleged reason to lie was
discovered, but the statements were deemed admissible.7 2 The
court allowed a statement to rehabilitate a witness, who was im-
peached when the defense counsel established that the witness
disliked the defendant.73
In United States v. Parry,74 the Fifth Circuit supported and ex-
panded the Gandy decision, by allowing both substantive and re-
habilitative statements to postdate the alleged motive to fabri-
cate. 75 The defendant was permitted to have a substantive prior
consistent statement introduced into evidence showing that he
was unaware of a DEA agent's identity. 6 The substantive evi-
dence supported the defendant's argument that he lacked criminal
intent in conspiring to distribute drugs.7 7
69 Id.
70 See United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting argument that
temporal requirement is necessary); United States v. Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134, 1134 (5th Cir.
1972) (permitting party to introduce evidence of prior consistent statement even though
statement was made after motive for fabrication), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 986 (1973).
71 469 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 986 (1973).
72 Id. at 1135. Gandy was on trial for selling five counterfeit federal reserve notes. Id.
The purchaser of the notes made incriminating statements against Gandy. Id.
73 Id. Gandy argued that the prior consistent statement was made after the altercation
and should not be admissible. Id. The Court disagreed and affirmed the district court's
judgement. Id.
74 649 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
75 Id. at 296.
76 Id. at 295. Judge Morgan ruled that it was in error for the district court to exclude the
defendant's mother's testimony as inadmissible hearsay. Id. The defendant claimed that
"he was working for the agents, assisting them in locating drug dealers." Id. at 294. In
support of this position the defense offered evidence of prior conversations between the
defendant and his mother, to establish that the defendant knew of the DEA agent's identity
from the outset. Id. This assisted Parry in proving that he was unaware of the agent's
identity and did not know that he was helping the agents. Id. This constituted substantive
evidence and demonstrates that the Fifth Circuit interpreted Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to include
the admission of substantive evidence generated after the motive to fabricate. Id. at 296.
77 Id. Parry was convicted of conspiring to distribute phenycylidine hydrochlide. Id. at
292. The court stated that "[u]nder Rule 801(d)(1)(B) [an] implied charge of recent
fabrication permitted Parry to introduce as substantive evidence his prior consistent state-
ment . . . ." Id. at 296.
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F. The Sixth Circuit
While most circuits have established a criteria for the admissi-
bility of prior consistent statements, the Sixth Circuit allows the
trial courts to decide whether a prior consistent statement may
post-date the alleged motive to fabricate.78 The trial courts do not
have to apply any temporal requirement when determining ad-
missibility. 79 Thus, substantive and rehabilitative uses for the
statements may be accepted after the motive to fabricate.80
In United States v. Hamilton,1 the court analyzed and rejected
the Second Circuit's third Quinto requirement that a prior consis-
tent statement be made before the motive to fabricate existed.8 2 It
was implied that a witness's account of events was influenced by a
deal with the government resulting in a motive to fabricate.8 3 The
court recognized that, although a motive to falsify may affect a
statement's materiality, that fact alone should not bar the state-
ment from being admitted.8 4
In United States v. Lawson,8 5 the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed Ham-
ilton and declared that the time the prior consistent statement
was made should not be a requirement to admissibility. 6 In Law-
son, the defendant questioned the decision of the court to admit
the prior consistent statements of three government witnesses
without adhering to the temporal requirement.8 7 The court stated
78 See United States v. Lawson, 872 F.2d 179 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 834 (1989).
The court declared that "[b]road discretion is given to the trial court regarding the admis-
sion of prior consistent statements," thus a trial court's determination, that a prior consis-
tent statement is admissible, may not be overturned because it postdated the motive to
fabricate. Id.
79 Id. at 182. The court stated that "temporal priority should not be a condition prece-
dent to admissibility." Id. To justify this position, the court explained that "there are other
indicia of reliability surrounding a prior consistent statement that make it relevant to re-
but a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive, then the fact that the statement was
made after the alleged motive to falsify should not preclude its admissibility." Id. at 183.
80 See United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1117 (1983). The court stated that while the "Circuit has not directly ruled on the
issue, we have indicated our desire for a more relaxed standard of admissibility under Rule
801(d)(1)(B) and our uneasiness with the Quinto decision." Id.
81 689 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983).
82 See id. at 1273. The court stated its desire for a relaxed standard of admissibility and
its uneasiness with the Quinto decision. Id.
83 Id. at 1273.
84 Id. (citations omitted). "In fact the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly and vigorously rejected
such a limitation on that rule." Id.
85 872 F.2d 179 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 834 (1989).
86 Id. at 182.
87 Id. Lawson was on trial for conspiring to receive, possess, and manufacture illegal
machine guns, as well as aiding and abetting a codefendant's manufacture and possession
of illegal machine guns. Id. The admission of statements by three government witnesses
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that other factors, including relevancy and probity, should be the
bases of determining whether a prior consistent statement is ad-
missible.8 This leaves the decision to admit with the respective
trial judge.8 9 The Sixth Circuit, in both Lawson and Hamilton, has
failed to distinguish between admitting statements for rehabilita-
tive and substantive purposes.
G. The Seventh Circuit
In the Seventh Circuit, substantive prior consistent statements
are admissible when they are made prior to the alleged motive to
fabricate, while rehabilitative statements may postdate the mo-
tive to lie.90 In United States v. Harris,91 the defendants ques-
tioned the admission of a rehabilitative, prior consistent state-
ment made by a witness after the motive to fabricate.92 However,
the court held that a prior statement must be made before the
motive to fabricate only for the admission of the substantive, not
rehabilitative, statements.9 3
The Harris court examined the third element of the Quinto cri-
teria and decided that the temporal requirement was only neces-
sary for substantive purposes.94 According to the court, repetition
did not necessarily imply veracity, and evidence which only
showed that the declarant said the same thing at trial, as he did
on a prior occasion, was of no probative value.9 5
was permitted even though the statements were made prior to the motive to fabricate. Id.
88 Id. at 183. The court stated that "where there are other indicia of reliability surround-
ing a prior consistent statement that make it relevant to rebut a charge of a recent
fabrication or improper motive, then the fact that the statement was made after the alleged
motive to falsify should not preclude its admissibility." Id. at 182.
89 Id. The court refered to Hamilton and mentions that the trial judge should be required
"to examine the circumstances under which the statement was made and make a determi-
nation of the statement's relevancy and probity." Id.
90 See United States v. Doyle, 771 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1985). The court found that
there was no motive for the witness to lie about the defendant's role in the bombing at the
time the statements were made and therefore, the statements were admitted. Id.; United
States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985). The temporal requirement only needs to
be met for statements used for substantive purposes. Id.
91 761 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1985).
92 Id. at 398. Yvonne and Josephine Harris were convicted of forging eligibility question-
naires and time sheets for a government-sponsored employment program and illegally re-
ceiving government funds. Id.
93 Id. at 399.
94 Id.
95 Id. The defendant cited United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1979), in an
attempt to show that the trial judge erred by admitting the testimony, but the Guevara
case did not address admitting prior consistent statements outside of the scope of Rule
801(d)(1)(B). See Harris, 761 F.2d at 399 n.2. In Guevara, prior consistent statements were
admitted, which "did not rebut the allegations of improper motive raised by the defendant."
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H. The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit allows the trial court to determine the ad-
missibility of prior consistent statements to rehabilitate testi-
mony.96 However, unlike rehabilitative statements, the Eighth
circuit does not permit substantive statements to postdate the mo-
tive to fabricate.97
In United States v. Bowman,9" four of the prosecution's wit-
nesses were impeached with prior inconsistent statements.99 The
court permitted the introduction of prior consistent statements,
that post-dated the motive to fabricate, as rehabilitative evi-
dence. 10 0 The Bowman court stressed that the better rule imposes
the requirement that prior consistent statements must come
before the motive to fabricate existed, but only for substantive
evidence.' 0 '
In United States v. Scholle,' °2 the court admitted a witness's
prior consistent statement after his testimony was impeached to
rehabilitate the witness's testimony. 103 It was alleged that the in-
carceration of the witness tainted his testimony. 04 Even though
the statements were determined to have been made prior to the
motive to fabricate, the court reasserted its position that prior
consistent statements used for rehabilitative purposes need not be
made prior to the motive to fabricate.' 8
In United States v. Andrade,'0 6 the credibility of the prosecu-
tion's FBI witness was questioned during an extensive cross-ex-
amination.' 7 Prior consistent statements were permitted at the
Guevara, 598 F.2d at 1100. The statement corroborated the declarant's testimony without
rebutting anything. Id. The court concluded that the "improper admission... constituted
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt," but it "did not prejudice the defendant" and the
verdict was affirmed. Id.
96 See United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 963
(1986).
97 See Andrade, 788 F.2d at 533 (noting that admission of prior consistent statement
based on its rehabilitative purpose).
98 798 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
99 Id. at 337.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 338.
102 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977).
103 Id. at 1121. Scholle and another individual were convicted of violating various nar-
cotic laws. Id.
104 Id. at 1122.
105 Id. The court rejected the proposition that a prior consistent statement needs to have
been made prior to the impeaching statements if used for rehabilitative purposes. Id.
106 788 F.2d 521 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 963 (1986).
107 See Andrade, 788 F.2d at 527. Andrade, and another individual, were on trial for
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discretion of the trial court in order to rebut the cross-examination
and rehabilitate the witness.10 The third Quinto criterion was
again questioned, and the court determined that it was not neces-
sary for rehabilitative statements. 10 9 Thus, if a trial court, in its
discretion, allows the admission of a rehabilitative statement that
post-dates the motive to fabricate, the Eighth Circuit will uphold
that decision, unless there has been a prejudicial abuse of
discretion. 110
I. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit requires that a prior consistent statement
come before the motive to fabricate,"' regardless of whether it is
used for rehabilitative or substantive purposes. 1 12 In 1972, three
years prior to the adoption of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the Ninth Circuit
stated in United States v. Rodriguez,113 that prior consistent
statements were admissible to rehabilitate a witness where it af-
firmatively appeared that the prior consistent statement was
made at a time when the declarant had no motive to fabricate. 114
In Rodriguez, a witness for the prosecution was asked incriminat-
ing questions during the defense counsel's cross-examination. 115
These questions impeached her credibility by insinuating that she
mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy. Id. The FBI's witness's credibility was brought into
question by Andrade. Id.
108 Id. at 532. Notes written by the FBI witness were offered to rehabilitate and support
his testimony Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. The Andrade court reinforced the logic found in United States v. Blankinship, 784
F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1986), by holding that the admissibility of rehabilitative statements
should be left to the discretion of the trial court. See Andrade, 788 F.2d at 532. In Blankin-
ship, the court admitted an employee's prior consistent statement, for rehabilitative pur-
poses, to rebut an in-court charge of a recent fabrication even though part of the same
statement was used against him. Blankinship, 784 F.2d at 320. The court declared that
'where portions of a witness' prior statement are used to impeach him, other portions of the
statement are admissible if they relate to the subject about which he was cross-examined,
and meet the force of the impeachment." Id. The admission or rejection of the "statement is
addressed to the sound discretion of [the] trial court and will not be reversed on appeal
except where there has been a prejudicial abuse of discretion." Id.
111 See United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1983) (improperly admitted
prior consistent statement that merely illustrated testimony was not reversible error, but
circuit mandates temporal requirement); United States v. Rodriguez, 452 F.2d 1146, 1148
(9th Cir. 1972) (mandating that prior consistent statements need to be made when declar-
ant had no motive to fabricate in order to be admissible).
112 See Rodriguez, 452 F.2d at 1148 (stating necessity for temporal requirement in all
situations).
113 452 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1972).
114 Id. at 1148. Rodriguez was convicted of importation and transportation of heroin, and
conspiracy to commit the substantive crimes. Id.
115 Id. The witness's direct testimony incriminated the defendant. Id.
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may have made a deal in exchange for leniency. 116
In United States v. Rohrer,"7 the Ninth Circuit held that the
admission of a diagram was improperly admitted as a prior consis-
tent statement. 1 18 According to the court, the motive to fabricate
already existed when the diagram was formulated, and therefore,
the court declared that the admission of the information was an
error.119 Although the court held that the admission did not con-
stitute a reversible error, it confirmed the validity of the Rodri-
guez decision by requiring that the prior consistent statement pre-
cede the motive for fabrication to conform with the hearsay
exception. 120
J. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit permits prior consistent statements to follow
the alleged motive to fabricate.' 2 ' In United States v. Tome,'2 2
counsel for the defense implied that a child fabricated allegations
of abuse in order to live with her mother. 123 The prosecution
wished to rehabilitate the child's testimony with a prior consistent
statement. 124 The court permitted the rehabilitation and did not
require the statement to come before the alleged motive to lie.
125
In United States v. Rios,126 counsel for the defense claimed that
the credibility of a witness was impeached when he was asked
questions pertaining to his protective custody status. 127 The court
stated that the admission of prior consistent statements was per-
mitted to rebut a false claim even though they were not made
116 Id. A previous conversation of the witness was admitted, which clearly antedated any
motive that she may have had to fabricate her testimony. Id.
117 708 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1983).
118 Id. at 433. The diagram was of the defendant's drug distribution ring. Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 351 (10th Cir. 1993) (deciding that victim's
prior consistent statements were not required to precede time of alleged motive to lie);
United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1349 (10th Cir. 1979) (declaring that witness's prior
consistent statements may be admitted to refute claim of recent fabrication even if state-
ments were not made prior to motive to fabricate), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981).122 3 F.3d 342 (10th Cir. 1993).
123 Id. at 346. The defendant was on trial for aggravated sexual abuse. Id.
124 Id. The court recognized "that prior consistent statements made after a strong motive
to lie has arisen may evidence only that the declarant is a constant liar." Id.
125 Id. The court stated that the temporal requirement is too broad and is "untenable
because it is simply not true that an individual with a motive to lie always will do so." Id.126 611 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981).
127 Id. at 1348. The court acknowledged that "evidence showing that the witness is in
protective custody may be prejudicial to the defendant." Id. at 1349.
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prior to the motive to fabricate.12 According to the court, there
was no abuse of discretion in allowing the jury to hear the consis-
tent statements. 129 The court did not distinguish if this pertained
solely to rehabilitative evidence or also included substantive
evidence.
130
K. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit allows the admission of rehabilitative
prior consistent statements that postdate the alleged
fabrication.' 3 ' In United States v. Anderson,1 32 the court admitted
a witness's prior consistent statement, under Rule 801(d)(1)(B),
that concerned a conspiracy to burn down a nightclub.133 The deci-
sion of the trial court was affirmed subsequent to a debate on
whether the supporting testimony was impeached.13 The court
declared that there was no impeachment, however, the admission
of the testimony constituted harmless error, and a prior consistent
statement could post-date the motive to lie. 135
In United States v. Pendas-Martinez,136 a Coast Guard officer's
handwritten report, concerning his pursuit of a boat carrying ma-
rijuana, was admitted as a prior consistent statement. 137 The de-
fense alleged that marijuana seeds were discovered on the officer's
vessel. 138 The court ruled that the report was improperly intro-
128 Id.
129 See Rios, 611 F.2d at 1349. The Rios court cited United States v. Herring, 582 F.2d
535 (10th Cir. 1978), which was another Tenth Circuit decision. Id. In Herring, the trial
court was given the discretion to make the determination if a statement was being used to
rebut a recent fabrication or was used because of an improper influence or motive. Herring,
582 F.2d at 541.
130 Rios, 611 F.2d at 1349.
131 See United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 942 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating
that circuit has repeatedly held that prior consistent statement need not have been made
prior to fabrication motive); United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 915-16 (11th Cir.
1986) (asserting that motive to fabricate is not relevant to admissibility of prior consistent
statements).
132 782 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1986).
133 Id. at 908. The defendants were on trial for various offenses arising from arson and
bombing of a nightclub. Id.
134 Id. at 915.
135 Id. The court stated that the circuit has "repeatedly rejected the assertion that a
prior consistent statement is inadmissible merely because it was made after the declarant
developed a motive to fabricate." Id. at 915-16.
136 845 F.2d 938 (11th Cir. 1988).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 942. The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess marijuana with
intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute 50 kilograms of marijuana on
board a United States vessel. Id.
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duced because it contained "hearsay within hearsay."' 39 This
abuse of discretion created an error that the court considered prej-
udicial.1 40 Accordingly, the convictions of the appellants were re-
versed and the matter was remanded for a new trial.' 4 ' The court
then discussed the relevance of a temporal requirement and con-
cluded that the consistent statement did not have to be made
before the alleged motive to fabricate arose.' 4
2
L. The District of Columbia Circuit
The District of Columbia Circuit also allows for prior consistent
statements to be admitted after the motive to fabricate. 43 In
United States v. Sampol,144 prior consistent statements were of-
fered to offset an expressed or implied charge of fabrication.145 A
contention, declaring that there were numerous impeaching cir-
cumstances at the time of the trial, was introduced. 4  The court
stated that it was well-established law in the District of Columbia
Circuit that in such cases the prior consistent statements could be
received.' 47 The court permitted the statements even though it
was probable that the statements were tainted because they were
made after the motive to lie.'14
In United States v. Montague, 49 the defendant claimed that the
admission of a prior consistent statement, by a witness for the
prosecution, was improper because there was no implied
fabrication.' The court disagreed because it was suggested that
the witness fabricated his testimony in the hope of receiving a
139 Id. The court stated that the report contained additional levels of hearsay which
would not be admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Id.
140 Id. The court stated that the evidence "contained additional levels of hearsay, which
rendered it inadmissible." Id.
141 United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 945 (l1th Cir. 1988).
142 Id. at 942. "This Circuit ... has held repeatedly that the consistent statement need
not have been made prior to the time that the alleged motive to fabricate arose." Id.
143 See United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v.
Sampol, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
144 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
145 Id. at 671. This case involved a prosecution arising after the former Chilean ambas-
sador to the United States, Orlando Letelier, was assassinated. Id.
146 Id. at 673. The defendants impeached a witness by showing that the witness denied
knowledge of the assassination in 1978. Id. at 671.
147 Id.
148 Id. The court permitted the admission of the statement declaring that Rule
801(d)(1)(B) provides a court with wide discretion. Id.
149 958 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
150 Id. at 1095. Montague was on trial for drug related charges. Id.
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lighter sentence in his conviction for possession of a firearm. 1 1
The temporal requirement was then examined and the court dis-
agreed with the necessity for the requirement. 152 The court stated
that implementing the requirement would almost totally bar the
testimony of defendants who decided to cooperate after arrest.1 53
II. REHABILITATIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE PRIOR CONSISTENT
STATEMENTS SHOULD NOT POSTDATE THE MOTIVE TO
FABRICATE
A. The Need for a Uniform Temporal Requirement
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not expressly impose a temporal admissi-
bility standard, which would require a prior consistent statement
to predate the motive to fabricate. 154 The circuit courts are divided
as to whether such a requirement exists. 155 The First, Second,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits admit prior consistent statements only
if they are made before the alleged motive to fabricate existed. 1 56
Alternatively, the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and the District of Columbia Circuits permit the state-
ments to postdate the motive. 157 Some of those circuits, such as
the Fifth and Sixth, permit substantive statements to follow the
motive to lie, 158 while other circuits, such as the Third, Seventh,
151 Id. at 1096.
152 Id. at 1098. The circuit analyzed the history of admitting prior consistent statements
and joined with "the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the prior consistent state-
ment need not have preceded the appearance of the motive in order to render the statement
non-hearsay, under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)." Id.
153 Id.
154 See Ohlbaum, supra note 5, at 232. Absent any direct language, different courts use
various interpretations, and "[slome courts have interpreted this dramatic change as
merely creating a second category of admissibility for prior consistent statements which in
no way intrudes upon admissibility for traditional rehabilitative purposes." Id. But
"[o]thers have seen the promulgation of the Rule as a relaxation of the traditional stan-
dards which allows the admission of prior consistent statements for substantive purposes,
rehabilitative purposes, or both." Id.
155 Id.
156 See, e.g., United States v. Vest, 842 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 812
(1988); United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1009 (1984); United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Quinto,
582 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1978).
157 See, e.g., United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v.
Casoni, 950 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 963 (1986); United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d
1262 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d
292 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 918 (1981).
158 See United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
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and Eighth, only allow rehabilitative statements.' 59
Prior consistent statements are admissible to rehabilitate or
substantiate testimony that has been impeached. 6 ° A charge of
recent fabrication or improper influence may impeach the validity
of the testimony, either by insinuating that the declarant has pur-
posefully misrepresented the testimony or by inferring that an im-
proper influence tainting his credibility exists.' 6 ' If the prior con-
sistent statement was made before the motive to fabricate, the
statement is credible because it comes before the alleged influ-
ence. 1 62 The prior consistent statement assists in rehabilitating
the witness by refuting the implication that his or her statement
is contrived. 6 3
If the motive to fabricate was already in existence at the time
the prior consistent statement was made, it would be subjected to
the same forces which initiated the impeachment of the witness's
testimony.16 4 The prior statement would be no more valid than
the present statement, and the fact that the witness made the
same declaration, at a time when the motive to lie existed, does
not assist in rehabilitating the witness. 65 Therefore, any benefit
that the statement may have presented is negated.16 6
1117 (1983); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
159 See United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Andrade,
788 F.2d 521 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 963 (1986); United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d
394 (7th Cir. 1985).
160 See Judith A. Archer, Prior Consistent Statements: Temporal Admissibility Standard
Under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), 55 FORDHAm L. REV. 759, 759 (1987).
161 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
162 See Archer, supra note 160, at 772-73. "A statement that antedates the fact or event
giving rise to an improper motive to fabricate is sufficiently independent of the motive to
aid the trier of fact in ascertaining the veracity of the in-court testimony." Id.
163 Id.
164 See United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1978). The court stated that any
statement admitting after the motive to fabricate would not be relevant. Id. at 233; John D.
Bennett, Prior Consistent Statements and Motives to Lie, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787, 809 (1987).
The author states:
[E]vidence which merely shows that the declarant said the same thing at trial as he
did on a prior occasion is of no probative value to rebut an allegation of recent
fabrication when the declarant's motive in making both statements was the same for
the simple reason that mere repetition does not imply veracity.
Id.
165 Quinto, 582 F.2d at 232. "The rationale for excluding most, but not all, prior consis-
tent statements being offered to establish the witness's credibility is one of relevancy." Id.
166 See Archer, supra note 160, at 773. "A prior consistent statement made while the
impeaching fact is in existence . . . is subject to the same motive to falsify as the in-court
testimony. The out-of-court statement is no more credible than the already impeached trial
testimony and is mere repetition." Id.
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B. Legislative Intent
Although the temporal requirement is not expressly provided
for in Rule 801(d)(1)(B), such an application may be inferred. 167
Opponents of the temporal requirement argue that had the draft-
ers required a temporal requirement, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) would
have expressly provided for such. 168 This is incorrect because the
drafters did not intend to modify common law admissibility stan-
dards.' 9 Rule 801(d)(1)(B) was only intended to establish a hear-
say exception for prior consistent statements, which would satisfy
common law admissibility requirements. 70
Specifically, the common law required that a prior consistent
statement was only admissible if made before the motive to fabri-
cate existed.1 7 ' Because a prior consistent statement would be
barred from postdating the motive to fabricate under the common
law, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) applies the same standard. 172 Thus, be-
cause the express provisions of the rule do not contradict the com-
mon law, the temporal requirement should continue to be
followed. 173
167 See id. at 773-74. The author states:
Admissibility of prior consistent statements under FRE 801(d)(1)(B) should be limited
to those statements made prior to, and independent of, the discrediting influence, be-
cause only then are they responsive to the impeachment. Because FRE 801(d)(1)(B)
presumes that prior consistent statements will be responsive to the impeachment, it is
implicit in the rule that only those statements antedating the motive to fabricate will
be admitted.
Id.
168 See Bennett, supra note 164, at 811. It has been argued that reading a temporal
requirement into the rule is asking too much of the court. Id. The author comments:
[A] requirement that a declarant have had no motive to fabricate when a prior consis-
tent statement was made goes beyond the language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and unneces-
sarily complicates judicial analysis of admissibility by requiring a judge to inquire into
whether motives existed at some time before the trial. Abandonment of the condition
would leave consideration of the motives behind these statements to the jury, where
the policies and the logic of the Rule suggest they belong.
Id.
169 Archer, supra note 160, at 775. "[T]he drafters intended to give substantive effect
only to those prior consistent statement that would have been admissible at common law
for rehabilitation." Id.
170 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's note. The admissibility to reha-
bilitate prior consistent statements at common law is given a substantive effect by the
Rule. Id.
171 See Archer, supra note 160, at 775. "Courts at common law required that the prior
consistent statement be made before the motive to fabricate arose. Thus, restricting admis-
sibility under the Rule to those statements made independent of the alleged motive to
fabricate best comports with the intent of the drafters." Id.
172 See id. at 775 (stating that at common law prior consistent statement must have
preceded motive to fabricate to be admissible).
173 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B); see also Archer, supra at 160, at 775 (stating that
since temporal requirement existed at common law, it should continue to be applied).
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the analysis of circuit court opinions, the admission
of a prior consistent statement should be limited to the situation
where the motive to lie post-dated the prior consistent statement.
Such a standard would be applicable whether the statement was
admitted for substantive or rehabilitative purposes. Although a
uniform standard would be the application intended by the draft-
ers of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), without its existence, the Supreme Court
must address this issue. The Supreme Court should mandate that
prior consistent statements may not post-date the fabrication
motive.
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